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Abstract
There are two ways that we might respond to the underdetermination of
theory by data. One response, which we can call the agnostic response,
is to suspend judgment: ‘Where scientific standards cannot guide us, we
should believe nothing.’ Another response, which we can call the fideist
response, is to believe whatever we would like to believe: ‘If science can-
not speak to the question, then we may believe anything without science
ever contradicting us.’ C.S. Peirce recognized these options and suggested
evading the dilemma. It is a Logical Maxim, he suggests, that there could
be no genuine underdetermination. This is no longer a viable option in
the wake of developments in modern physics, so we must face the dilemma
head on. The agnostic and fideist responses to underdetermination rep-
resent fundamentally different epistemic viewpoints. Nevertheless, the
choice between them is not an unresolvable struggle between incommen-
surable worldviews. There are legitimate considerations tugging in each
direction. Given the balance of these considerations, there should be a
modest presumption of agnosticism. This may conflict with Peirce’s Log-
ical Maxim, but it preserves all that we can preserve of the Peircean
motivation.
1. Peirce’s Logical Maxim
2. The concept of underdetermination
3. Our dilemma
4. Endgame
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The underdetermination of theory by data is often taken to guarantee that
some questions cannot be answered by any amount of enquiry. Underdeter-
mination of this kind would confront us with a dilemma: Either we remain
forever and inextricably agnostic about the underdetermined questions or we
apportion our beliefs by fiat. C.S. Peirce recognized this dilemma, and we can
use his answer to it as a way of framing the problem. Peirce thought neither
horn of the dilemma was acceptable, so he suggested that there could be no
underdetermination of this kind.
1 Peirce’s Logical Maxim
In the manuscript written for his fourth lecture at Harvard in 1903, Peirce
claims that— as a matter of logic— we must never say that some questions
could never be answered. As we might say today, he denies that there could
be any underdetermination. (Contemporary discussions of underdetermination
often take Poincare´ or Duhem as their starting point; Peirce here explicitly
takes issue with Poincare´.) “Let me recommend this Logical Maxim to you,”
he writes, “Never allow yourself to think that any definite problem is incapable
of being solved to any assignable degree of perfection” [Pei97, p. 273].1 Peirce
worries: If we do think that there is underdetermination, then we will either
make the error of agnosticism or the related mistake of “simply accept[ing] what
opinions suit our fancy or convenience, or seem likely to advance our interests”
[Pei97, p. 273]. This latter mistake of believing whatever is convenient is the
sort of vulgarity for which pragmatists have too often been condemned, but
Peirce thinks it is “the prevalent [mistake] in regard to philosophy, the world
over.”
Peirce suggests that matters which are presumed insoluble will be resolved
quickly enough when “the right distinction” is introduced [Pei97, p. 273]. If you
think some matter is insoluble, he writes:
The likelihood is that it will be solved long before you could have
dreamed possible. Think of Auguste Comte who when asked to
name any thing that could never be found out instanced the chemical
composition of the fixed stars; and almost before his book became
known to the world at large, the first steps had been taken in spectral
analysis. [Pei97, p. 273]
He gives us the example of Comte, who wrongly thought that theories of stellar
composition were underdetermined. Peirce thinks that the Logical Maxim can
be given an “historical induction” with examples of this kind. Look around, he
suggests, and we will see that putative cases of underdetermination have always
or often been resolved in the course of enquiry.
1This passage appears in a section that Peirce probably planned to omit from the lecture.
(See Turisi’s editorial note [Pei97, p. 272].) Since the section would have been a digression
in the lecture, I suggest that the omission was for rhetorical reasons and not because of any
second thoughts about the ideas expressed.
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Peirce also thinks that the Logical Maxim admits of stronger demonstration.
“It rests,” he says, “on the consideration of the nature of reasoning . . .[and]. . .
experimentation” [Pei97, p. 274]. Underdetermination would thus be inimical to
the very nature of experimental method. Unfortunately, he says nothing further
in the manuscript to suggest what this consideration is supposed to be.
We should be less sanguine about the verdict of an historical induction and
considerations of experimental reasoning. Given developments since Peirce’s
time, we have been led by reasoning and experiment to accept quantum me-
chanics and relativity, and each entails limits to enquiry that resist dissolution
by “the right distinction.” According to many interpretations of quantum me-
chanics, the theory posits states of the world that we cannot discover beyond
some knowable degree of precision. General relativity is even more striking; it
entails that the structure of spacetime can preclude our learning certain impor-
tant facts about the world [Gly77] [Mal77]. It seems as if it must be impossible
to have a causal influence on our own past, for example, but relativity entails
that— if it were impossible— the structure of spacetime would make it impossi-
ble for any observer to know this [Mal77, p. 71–2]. If it were possible to influence
our own past, then it might be possible to know this. Nevertheless, physicists
do not allow logic to dictate whether such closed causal curves exist. Here in
history and practice, physicists have not followed Peirce’s Logical Maxim. One
might say that physicists are wrong and that they should follow the Maxim, but
one cannot then appeal to the history and practice of physics as support for the
Logical Maxim itself.
So there is a prima facie conflict between modern physics and Peirce’s Logi-
cal Maxim. In §4.2, I consider I consider a different interpretation of the Maxim
which could reconcile it with physics. For now, let’s consider what we might do
when faced with insolubilia. As Peirce notes, we would be forced into a dilemma
between agnosticism and willy-nilly belief. So which should it be?
2 The concept of underdetermination
Before exploring the dilemma in the next section, I want to be clear about what
‘underdetermination’ means in this context. Plausibly, the term refers to cases
where responsible theory choice would be impossible given any logically possible
evidence— think of Cartesian sceptical scenarios in which ‘everything is just as
if there were an external world.’ It is also natural to say that the choice between
theories is underdetermined if it would be impossible to decide between them
given the laws of nature— for instance, determination of the global structure of
spacetime might require travelling faster than the speed of light (as in Glymour
[Gly77] and Malament [Mal77], cited above). Other authors speak of ‘transient
underdetermination’ that effects theory choice in early historical periods but
not at later times (as in Sklar [Skl85] and Stanford [Sta01]). All of these involve
an inability to decide between theories, but the inability is of different scope in
each case.
As such, specifying a case of underdetermination involves specifying the
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range of possible circumstances across which responsible theory choice would
be impossible. Call this range of circumstances the scope of the underdetermi-
nation. The choice between belief in an external world and belief in a Cartesian
sceptical scenario, if it is underdetermined, is underdetermination with a scope
that includes all logically possible circumstances. The global structure of space-
time is underdetermined with a scope that includes only nomologically possible
circumstances. Transient cases will be underdetermined with a scope that in-
cludes earlier circumstances but not later ones. In general, we can entertain
cases where the scope is any range of circumstances whatsoever. If the choice
between rival theories cannot be made responsibly given any of the circum-
stances in the scope, then we can say that the theory choice is underdetermined
with that scope. Menacing cases of underdetermination will be those for which
our present circumstance is in the scope of the case (We can’t responsibly dis-
tinguish between the theories now) and it would be hard or impossible for us to
escape the scope (We can’t change our circumstances so that we could distin-
guish between the theories).
A claim of underdetermination, then, is a claim that ordinary scientific con-
siderations leave scientists no way to decide between competing theories in a
certain range of circumstances. This implicitly relies on a conception of ordi-
nary scientific considerations; that is, a standard for how scientists may respon-
sibly decide between theories. Specifying a case of underdetermination thus
requires specifying three things (at least implicitly): rival theories, a scope, and
a standard.2
With these ideas in place, let’s return to the dilemma.
3 Our dilemma
Cases of underdetermination with maximal scope— cases that could not be
decided responsibly under any imaginable circumstances— elicit these two con-
flicting intuitions. The agnostic intuition is that, since the choice is forever
beyond determination, one ought forever to suspend judgment about which of
the rivals is true. The fideist intuition is that one might freely believe one of
the rivals even now, since further enquiry will have no bearing on the question
either way. The agnostic impulse is, in effect, to insist that the usual standard
for responsible choice should hold even when it makes a theory choice undeter-
mined with maximal scope; the only responsible thing to do in such cases is to
be indifferent between the rivals. Contrarily, the fideist suggests that where a
theory choice is underdetermined with maximal scope given the usual standard,
one ought to suspend the usual standard in favor of the standard ‘Believe what
you will.’ On this alternate standard, the choice need not be underdetermined.
The agnostic may try to provide a direct answer to the fideist by arguing that
the usual standards are the unique standards of rationality. Scientific standards
are historical products, however, and calling them rational does not show that
2This framework is developed at greater length in [Mag03] and [Mag].
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they should apply under all circumstances. The fideist, after all, is arguing
about what counts as reasonable.
As the terms are often used, ‘agnosticism’ and ‘fideism’ regard religious ques-
tions. Here I mean them pick out views about how to respond to underdeter-
mination in general— whether the enquiry is religious or secular. The agnostic
approach is reflected in Descartes’ reply to the sceptical scenarios and in much
of the modern tradition. The fideist approach can be found in the writings in-
ter alia of James [Jam48], Duhem [Duh54], and van Fraassen [van02], although
I am overlooking certain subtleties in their views. For instance, James advo-
cates fideism only for ‘forced’ and ‘momentous’ questions. This parallels the
distinction Peirce sometimes draws between ‘vital’ questions and those which
may be settled by rational enquiry. Regarding this complicated issue, see Hook-
way [Hoo02, esp. ch. 1]. For the sake of discussion here, I will sidestep it and
consider the unqualified fideism that makes no such distinction.
3.1 A test case: Other minds
An example may help evoke these intuitions. Let the set of rivals contain one
theory according to which you and most other human beings have minds and
another according to which only you the reader have a mind and everyone else
merely behaves as if they do. The rivalry between these two theories amounts
to the familiar problem of other minds. It is arguably underdetermined with
maximal scope, since the two rivals would lead us to expect exactly the same
course of events in the world.
There is a sense in which fideism regarding this question could do no harm.
If there were any negative repercussions from choosing the wrong theory, then
there would be a circumstance in which you could decide the question: You
could see in retrospect that the other one must have been preferable, and fallout
from choosing poorly would provide a sort of experimental test. If the choice
is underdetermined with a scope that includes all circumstances, such tests are
precluded. So no harm could come from being a fideist.
Yet the fact that the theory choice has no practical consequences that could
be used to test either theory does not entail that it has no practical consequences
tout court. If you believe that you would have moral duties to people that you
would not have to automatons, then there is a practical difference between the
two. From one theory, it follows that you have a duty not to commit murder;
from the other, it follows that murder is of a kind with smashing a television.
Further experience will not contradict you in either case, but you may well act
differently if you believe one rather than the other. How would you act if, taking
the agnostic position, you remained indifferent between the two possibilities?
How would you order your affairs if you lived with a real and persistent doubt
as to whether other humans had mental lives like you have? It is tempting
to think that you would become what the rest of us would call a sociopath.
Sincere agnosticism about other minds, like solipsism, carries at least the hint
of madness. Given your willingness to say that other people have experiences
just as you do, doesn’t it mean you are willing to relax your epistemic scruples
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on this matter?
If so, then the fideist wins the point. The agnostic may respond by argu-
ing that the problem is not underdetermined. She may say: The madness of
suspending judgement on this matter shows that the choice is not underdeter-
mined even on ordinary standards, since any reasonable standard would allow
you to choose the sane choice over the mad one.3 Philosophers have offered a
panoply reasons to believe in other minds rather than solipsism— readers are
invited to consider their favorites. If such arguments are successful, then the
case is not underdetermined. Thus, the agnostic may admit that there is an
intuition about other minds while denying that the intuition speaks to the issue
of underdetermination.
3.2 The cost of fideism
Moreover, the agnostic may insist, fideism could do unintended harm. Good
querists realize that reflective and deliberate application of standards is not
enough. They try to develop habits of applying the standards of responsible
theory choice; they cultivate these inclinations, so that they would feel uncom-
fortable accepting claims for which no good reasons can be adduced. They also
place themselves in a social order that enforces the standards for responsible
theory choice, they willingly put themselves in a situation where they would
be chastised for capricious belief. The fideist only suspends the usual standard
when a theory choice is underdetermined with maximal scope, to be sure, but
he must thus work to weaken his and the community’s habitual application of
the usual standard. Suppose that the choice between two theories is underde-
termined with a maximal scope and that the fideist prefers to believe one rather
than the other. If he ever has occasion to consider his choice, he will need to
steel himself against his habituated unease; he will need to suppress the reaction
which he cultivates in usual cases. Perhaps in reflective moments he will apply
the usual standards as well as any querist. In more mundane moments, though,
his habits will be weaker than those of the agnostics who spent no energy weak-
ening theirs. There may well come a time when he will blunder where they
might apply the usual standard by force of habit.4
The fideist might reply: It is an empirical question as to whether querists
are best served by relying on brute habit. Perhaps for the bulk of enquiry and
for the bulk of querists, for normal scientists doing normal science, this will be
the case. Those who are of stronger character can distinguish between cases,
however. They will recognize the differences between cases underdetermined
with maximal scope where they may believe as they will and cases underdeter-
mined with narrower scope. Why should such stronger types be held back from
exercising their strong character?
3This line of argument is a running theme in the works of Thomas Reid. See my [Mag03,
ch. 2].
4Developing themes from Peirce, Hookway [Hoo02, ch. 10] argues that cognitive habits
play a crucial roˆle in enquiry.
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The agnostic replies in turn: It is doubtful that anyone has such a strong
character, but that is— as you say— an empirical matter. Even if some scientists
do have such a character, they should not exercise it. As it is said: “Be careful
that the exercise of your freedom does not become a stumbling block to the
weak.” [1Corinthians, 8:9]. Other scientists would either decide that they, too,
could believe as they chose or be forced to admit that they had weak cognitive
constitutions. If the former, then their habits would be weakened. If the latter,
then they would be disheartened, and a unhealthy social division would be
drawn among scientists. Thus if any scientists are such that their habits will
be significantly eroded by fideism, then the whole community should embrace
agnosticism.
The fideist replies, of course, but we can leave them to the dialogue. There
are open questions of the degree to which habit formation is a good way to
instill the usual standards of reasonable theory choice, the degree to which
fideism would undercut these habits, and the degree to which fideism for a few
would disrupt the community. These are questions which must be answered by
further methodological reflection and psychological data.
3.3 Fideism and narrower scope
The fideist intuition is strongest in cases, like the alleged underdetermination
about other minds, where the scope is maximal. The fideist may further wish
to suspend the usual standards of responsibility for choices which are underde-
termined with a narrower scope— for instance, a scope of all naturally possi-
ble circumstances as defined by some well-confirmed background theory. This
would exacerbate the problem of poor habits, since choices which are subject to
the usual standards may closely resemble ones which are exempted from those
standards.
Consider that special relativity entails that an observer cannot be affected
by events outside her past light cone.5 Supposing that she can only responsi-
bly make theory choices on the basis of events to which she has some causal
connection, specific claims about events outside her past light cone will be un-
derdetermined for her with a scope constrained by what is possible given the
laws of nature. Consider two events, call them I and O. Suppose that I was,
from our observer’s frame of reference, one thousand years in the past and 50
cm inside the surface of her past light cone and that O was, again from the
observer’s frame of reference, simultaneous with I but 50 cm outside the surface
of her past light cone. (As in figure 1.)
Following the fideism here on offer, she may believe whatever she likes about
O but not so with I which was a mere meter away— even if I was some small
event which would be practically impossible for her to discern. This is subject
to the same worries about personal habit and social norms as fideism applied
to cases of maximal scope, but perhaps she can will her belief about O while
5The entailment presumes a slightly cartooned version of relativity, but the complications
are incidental to the argument here.
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Figure 1: The observer may be effected now by I, but not by O, since the latter
is outside the observer’s past light cone
reminding herself that she only has this freedom because of relativity, without
being less apt to notice errors in reasoning about I, and without harming the
social order. Insofar as she can do that, however, she is encouraged to treat rel-
ativity as an inevitable and immutable constraint on possibility. If she seriously
allowed for the possibility that it might be false, she would treat O as of a kind
with I, both as events that she could not discern. Thus, fideist treatment of
a particular claim about O would undercut her ability to be a fallibilist about
the background theories that specify the relevant sense of natural possibility.
Since she only needs to protect her willful judgment about O, she could allow
for theory changes that would further constrain (rather than expand) the rele-
vant sense of possibility. Since responsible change in theory may as easily open
new possibilities as close them, however, this half-hearted fallibilism offers little
comfort.
The fideist approach may be applied to cases of still narrower scope, but the
problems only increase. Further problems arise and— for a theory choice under-
determined only with a scope so narrow that it excludes recognized, practical
possibilities— agnosticism clearly wins out. Imagine, as an example of such a
case, the question of whether there are serious side effects associated with an
exotic drug. A large-scale, clinical trial would resolve the question, but it is
underdetermined with a scope that includes only circumstances where the trial
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has not been performed.6 If we have not performed the trial, we are not in a
position to say whether the drug has side effects. Yet it would be perverse to
decide that it does have side effects if we merely find the drug distasteful. Here
the fideist intuition has no sway. More generally, it would be perverse to will
to believe regarding a matter that would be open to investigation if only we
would will to investigate. The fideist suggestion was to substitute the standard
‘Believe what you will’ for the usual standard in some special cases, but invoking
that standard in cases that might be resolved by ordinary investigation is— in
effect— to insist that it should be the usual standard.
4 Endgame
To summarize the action so far: There is an intuition that in cases underdeter-
mined with maximal scope it would be permissible to believe anything, since the
course of events would never force one to alter the willed belief. Such a practice
may have deleterious consequences for individuals and for the community, but
whether it does is an open and at least partly empirical question. The only
plausible fideism regards cases of very wide scope, so underdetermination with
middling and narrower scope will require a different response regardless.
4.1 An uneasy resolution
Since we don’t know exactly how high the costs of fideism would be, we face a
decision under uncertainty. We might make a leap of faith and deem the costs of
fideism to be low enough, but this would be tantamount to being a fideist about
the cost of fideism. The question of what fideism costs is at least partly empirical
and hence is not underdetermined with maximal scope. Further enquiry could
tell us more about it.
As I’ve argued, fideism becomes implausible for narrow scope cases like this
one. It is thus incumbent on the fideist to show either that the indirect costs
of fideism are negligible, that the costs are worth paying, or (contra what I
argued above) that fideism is the right response to some questions which are
underdetermined only with a narrow scope. Until one of these is shown, we
should be agnostic about the costs of fideism.
The agnostic gives the conservative counsel that we should apply the usual
standards in all cases. The fideist pleads for a risky special standard. Until we
know more about what might follow from unusual standards in unusual cases,
prudence demands agnosticism. So there should be a modest presumption in
favor of agnosticism generally. Agnosticism wins the day not with a bang, but
a whimper.
6Perhaps the question could be decided without a clinical trial, for instance with an epi-
demiological study of a population that took the drug recreationally. The scope of the under-
determination, then, must also exclude circumstances where such populations exist.
9
4.2 What’s left of the Logical Maxim
Peirce was serious, I think, about the Logical Maxim that prohibited us ever to
say that a particular problem could not be solved to an assignable degree. He
did identify agnosticism and (what I’ve called) fideism as our two options should
we face insoluble problems, but he didn’t think we should seriously entertain
either. He would have viewed the discussion here as, at best, a hypothetical
exercise with an impossible antecedent. So Peirce would have bristled at where
modern physics has taken us. Nevertheless, I don’t think that the insolubilia
entailed by modern physics need have worried him too much.
Peirce’s Logical Maxim would require that we say it is impossible for enquiry
to face some insurmountable barrier. However, this is ambiguous. Following
Peirce, we can distinguish between two senses of possibility: a subjective and an
objective sense. (See [Pei98, p. 355] and also [Mey02, p. 147].) The subjective
sense is an epistemic modality: P is (subjectively) possible if we cannot be
certain that ∼P . The objective sense is a real modality: P is (objectively)
possible if is not nomologically necessary that ∼P .
Let D(E, p) stand for ‘It is objectively possible to resolve enquiry E beyond
to precision p.’ We can understand Peirce’s Logical Maxim in two ways:
LM1: ‘For all E, p, D(E, p)’
LM2: ‘For all E, p, it’s subjectively possible that D(E, p)’
For the reasons offered above, LM1 conflicts with contemporary physics. That
is, we now think that it is nomologically impossible to resolve certain questions.
Yet we can show that LM2 has no such conflict. Suppose that we now believe
a theory T that entails ∼D(E, p) for some E. That is, T entails that enquiry
E could never be resolved. If we recognize that our belief is fallible, then we
believe T provisionally. Perhaps as a practical matter we might abandon active
pursuit of E, but we should not ruthlessly prohibit speculation about it. We
should expect never to settle E, but that expectation should never be more
secure than our provisional belief in T .
The agnosticism that worried Peirce in the Harvard lectures is “a recom-
mendation that a certain line of inquiry be entirely abandoned” [Pei97, p. 273,
my emphasis]. As we’ve just seen, the agnostic response to underdetermination
does not provide such a recommendation. It counsels instead that we should
suspend judgment until more evidence becomes available. If our physics tells
us that there will never be evidence to settle the matter, then we should not
expect it to be settled. But we would only consider the matter completely closed
if we think that our physics is infallible. As we’ve seen, treating a question as
forever underdetermined requires treating the limitation on knowledge as eter-
nally fixed. This, I think, is what would have worried Peirce the most— the
connection between agnosticism (in his sense) and a dogmatism about the limits
of knowledge.
If we understand Peirce’s Logical Maxim as LM2, there is a simple argument
for it. Peirce advocates what Meyers calls unrestricted fallibilism, the doctrine
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that “no proposition can be known with certainty and hence that we may be
mistaken about any proposition” [Mey02, p. 145]. We can rewrite it this way:
UF : ‘For all P , it’s subjectively possible that ∼P ’
If we instantiate UF for an arbitrary ∼D(E, p), LM2 follows as an immediate
consequence. Since we know that Peirce thought of fallibilism as a matter of
methodology, this might have been the what Peirce had in mind.
If so, his example of Auguste Comte is misleading. There is no general
principle that shows Comte was wrong to think it was (objectively) impossible
to know the composition of the stars. Rather, his error was in deriving the
impossibility from his philosophy and expecting science to abide by it. Since
some limit to our knowledge is a consequence of our science, we should believe
in it as much as we believe in our science. We should not think that this forever
closes the matter— any more than we should think our present science will
stand forever.
Perhaps Peirce would still have objected to this weak, fallibilist agnosticism.
Given developments in modern physics, however, I don’t see how we have any
other choice.
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